Control, not biography
A valid signature can show control of a key. By itself, it does not prove a legal name, reputation, intent, or trustworthiness.
Early-stage standards project
Know which key answered.
Counterparty Verification is exploring a careful way for two parties to confirm control of cryptographic identities—without placing private documents, names, or personal details on a public blockchain.
Research and design phase. No public verification service is active yet.
ACounterparty AWallet identity key
signed challenge↔private verification
BCounterparty BWallet identity key
Verify control. Reveal less.
A narrow promise
Verification should say exactly what was checked.
Consent before disclosure
Each party should understand the request and choose which information—if any—to reveal.
Private by default
Challenges, responses, and private attributes should remain off-chain unless a separate, explicit action requires a public proof.
Planned verification flow
A short-lived challenge, answered by the right key.
This is the design direction—not yet a live product workflow.
- 1Request
One party creates a narrowly scoped verification request with a short expiration.
- 2Consent
The other party sees what is being requested before their wallet performs an operation.
- 3Prove control
The wallet signs a fresh challenge so an old response cannot simply be replayed.
- 4Record the result
A receipt states what was verified, when, under which protocol, and what the result does not prove.
Built in the open
BSV standards under evaluation.
The project will use maintained BSV Association specifications rather than inventing an ambiguous “verified” badge.
BRC-100Wallet interfaceApplication-to-wallet operations
BRC-3Digital signaturesCreation and verification
BRC-42Key derivationSeparated derived keys
BRC-43Permission contextProtocols, key IDs, counterparties
BRC-103Mutual authenticationPeer identity and certificates
BRC-104HTTP transportAuthenticated web requests
Important boundary
Verified is not the same as trustworthy.
Cryptography can verify control of a key and the integrity of a response. It cannot independently establish a person’s legal identity, authority, safety, honesty, or suitability for a transaction. Any future workflow will describe the exact claim and evidence behind every result.
Related work
Privacy lessons already being tested in TAYLOR.
The TAYLOR project uses BRC-100 wallet operations, BRC-2 encryption, separated derived keys, private evidence storage, and carefully limited public blockchain anchors.